Evidence analysisOctober 30, 2026Accountability

Five Questions About Trump’s ‘America First’ Approach to Fighting Corruption

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Accountability and Anti-Corruption Enforcement Under Trump’s ‘America First’ Policy

This evidence dossier examines the reported evolution of U.S. anti-corruption enforcement policy during the administration of President Donald Trump, based on an interview and analysis by Lorenzo Crippa, a political economist specializing in corruption enforcement and its impact on global financial practices. The content draws from an October 2026 OCCRP feature discussing shifts in the enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and broader implications for international anti-corruption efforts.

What is established

  • The U.S. administration under President Trump paused enforcement of the FCPA in early 2025, later resuming it with new guidelines aimed at reducing “undue burdens” on American companies operating abroad.
  • This change aligns with an “America First” unilateral foreign policy that involved the U.S. withdrawing from numerous international organizations, including the Council of Europe’s anti-corruption body GRECO.
  • The U.S. government has signaled its preference to use unilateral tools—such as sanctions and visa restrictions—over multilateral collaborative frameworks to combat corruption.
  • Data and market responses following the suspension of the FCPA showed significant increases in stock prices for American firms historically targeted by FCPA enforcement, interpreted as investor anticipation of laxer enforcement and potentially increased corrupt activity.
  • Research indicates that past multilateral anti-corruption agreements like the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention were effective in prompting certain firms to reduce bribery, but also led to increased bribery by firms outside the treaty’s scope, highlighting enforcement limitations.

What the source claims

  • Lorenzo Crippa argues that the unilateral approach adopted by the Trump administration runs counter to evidence favoring international cooperation as the most effective way to address global corruption.
  • There is skepticism about the effectiveness of unilateral anti-corruption enforcement compared to coordinated global regimes, particularly in light of political science research and observed financial market behaviors.
  • The Trump administration’s policy may be implicitly creating a double standard by easing enforcement pressure on U.S. firms while potentially applying harsher standards to non-American companies.
  • This selective enforcement risks “weaponizing” anti-corruption laws in a way that could disadvantage foreign competitors and undermine the integrity of U.S. anti-corruption initiatives.
  • The partial suspension and recalibration of FCPA enforcement appear to have encouraged market expectations of tolerance for corrupt practices among American firms, a departure from the historical linkage between good governance and business valuation.
  • Expanding multilateral treaties to include currently non-participating countries could mitigate enforcement leakage, a phenomenon where bribery shifts to firms outside treaty obligations.

What may be missing from the usual framing

  • The interview and analysis do not detail concrete case studies or extensive enforcement data post-guideline changes, limiting assessment of long-term outcomes.
  • There is limited discussion about the perspectives of American companies benefiting from the policy or of foreign firms facing stricter enforcement, which could reveal varied interests and impacts.
  • While the analysis critiques the “America First” policy’s unilateralism, it does not fully explore potential arguments made by U.S. officials who assert that unilateral tools might be more adaptive or quicker instruments in current geopolitical contexts.
  • The examination omits broader geopolitical or economic contexts that may have influenced the Trump administration’s recalibration of anti-corruption enforcement, such as trade tensions or diplomatic realignments.

Competing evidence or uncertainty

  • Political science literature broadly supports international cooperation in anti-corruption, but the data on the efficacy of unilateral tools like sanctions and visa restrictions remain mixed, with some studies showing counterproductive effects on American firms linked to sanctioned entities.
  • The extent to which enforcement shifts have materially altered corruption levels globally or U.S. firms’ behavior remains unclear due to a current limited number of new cases following policy changes.
  • Critiques exist that the FCPA was historically wielded with geopolitical motives, suggesting that some degree of strategic enforcement is not new; thus, the Trump approach might represent a recalibration rather than a complete departure.
  • The risk of “leakage” of corrupt practices to non-signatory firms under multilateral treaties points to enduring challenges in anti-corruption governance that no single policy adjustment fully resolves.

Why it matters

The manner in which a major global actor like the United States enforces anti-corruption laws significantly influences international business practices, corporate governance norms, and geopolitical power dynamics. A shift toward unilateral, selective enforcement may:

  • Weaken global anti-corruption cooperation mechanisms.
  • Encourage corrupt practices among firms perceiving enforcement gaps or double standards.
  • Potentially distort market valuations and investment decisions based on anticipated regulatory leniency.
  • Expose American firms to backlash or complex compliance risks if unilateral measures prove insufficient or mutually contradictory with other countries’ policies.
  • Raise questions about the legitimacy and impartiality of the U.S. as an anti-corruption enforcer when enforcement appears to protect domestic companies while penalizing foreign competitors.

What to verify next

  • The number, nature, and outcomes of FCPA enforcement actions since the 2025 suspension and subsequent recalibration.
  • Detailed case studies illustrating whether and how the enforcement has differentially affected American vs. non-American firms.
  • Assessments from international anti-corruption bodies or agencies on the impact of the U.S. withdrawal from GRECO and shifts toward unilateral enforcement tools.
  • Further economic and compliance data clarifying investor and corporate responses to the new enforcement climate over a longer timeframe.
  • Statements or analyses from U.S. agencies justifying the shift and detailing intended policy goals and expected impacts.

Readers are encouraged to consult the original OCCRP interview and related research to explore these topics in full detail and context.

Source & verification

Primary source: OCCRP · October 30, 2026

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